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This data article provides a descriptive overview of the Cities and Armed Conflict Events (CACE) dataset and the data collection methods. The dataset provides a systematic coding of armed conflict events taking place in cities and outside cities across the globe. It constitutes an extension of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Events Dataset (GED) version 18.1 and covers 1989–2017. To identify which events of armed conflict took place in cities, the data was manually matched to to data from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). The dataset enables systematic analysis of urban-rural patterns in armed conflict, as illustrated by Elfversson & Höglund [1]. While existing methods for analysing such patterns frequently rely on matching conflict data to spatial grids combined with population density, the data presented here with higher validity captures whether violent events take place in cities.

How does government bias affect prospects for peace agreements in communal conflicts? Government bias has been shown to have a strong impact on the incidence and dynamics of localized ethnic conflict, but the way that it affects conflict resolution remains underexplored. I argue that government bias makes the conflict parties less likely to overcome the commitment problem, because they cannot trust the government's willingness to guarantee or uphold any agreement they reach. Consequently, bias reduces the chances that the parties are able to reach a peace agreement. A systematic comparison of four cases in Kenya provides support for this argument. I also distinguish between bias related to strategic interest and bias related to relationships, and find that the former is more durable, whereas the latter is more likely to be influenced by political turnover, thereby opening up possibilities for peacemaking.

This chapter analyzes patterns of communal conflict – i.e., violent conflicts between non-state groups which are organized based on communal identities – in Kenya. The politicized nature of ethnicity in Kenya, and the fact that both elections and land tenure are closely associated with ethnic identity, are highlighted as key factors explaining the prevalence of violent communal conflict. After discussing the main patterns of conflict since 1989, the chapter goes on to identify four main drivers of conflict: electoral politics, cattle raiding, local resources, and boundaries and local authority. The specific dynamics at play in different conflicts vary, and empirical examples illustrate how the precise way that different conflict drivers interact is different from case to case. The chapter also discusses different strategies by state and non-state actors to address and resolve communal conflicts, and how devolution – the decentralization of significant power to the local level under the 2010 constitution – has affected communal conflicts. As the discussion of devolution illustrates, a major point is that while communal conflicts in general should be seen against the background of a state and a political culture where ethnicity is strongly politicized, the impact of national-level political dynamics on communal conflicts will vary from case to case.

How does government bias affect prospects for peace agreements in communal conflicts? Government bias has been shown to have a strong impact on the incidence and dynamics of localized ethnic conflict, but the way that it affects conflict resolution remains underexplored. I argue that government bias makes the conflict parties less likely to overcome the commitment problem, because they cannot trust the government's willingness to guarantee or uphold any agreement they reach. Consequently, bias reduces the chances that the parties are able to reach a peace agreement. A systematic comparison of four cases in Kenya provides support for this argument. I also distinguish between bias related to strategic interest and bias related to relationships, and find that the former is more durable, whereas the latter is more likely to be influenced by political turnover, thereby opening up possibilities for peacemaking.

The report summarizes the findings of the author's PhD dissertation Central Politics and Local Peacemaking (2017), with a particular emphasis on policy relevant omplications. The report is available for download at www.eba.se.

Under what conditions can peace be established after violent communal conflict? This question has received limited research attention to date, despite the fact that communal conflicts kill thousands of people each year and often severely disrupt local livelihoods. This dissertation analyzes how political dynamics affect prospects for peace after communal conflict. It does so by studying the role of the central government, local state and non-state actors, and the interactions between these actors and the communal groups that are engaged in armed conflict. A particular focus is on the role of political bias, in the sense that central government actors have ties to one side in the conflict or strategic interests in the conflict issue. The central claim is that political bias shapes government strategies in the face of conflict, and influences the conflict parties' strategic calculations and ability to overcome mistrust and engage in conflict resolution. To assess these arguments, the dissertation strategically employs different research methods to develop and test theoretical arguments in four individual essays. Two of the essays rely on novel data to undertake the first cross-national large-N studies of government intervention in communal conflict and how it affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Essay I finds that conflicts that are located in an economically important area, revolve around land and authority, or involve groups with ethnic ties to central rulers are more likely to prompt military intervention by the government. Essay II finds that ethnic ties, in turn, condition the impact that government intervention has on the risk of conflict recurrence. The other two essays are based on systematic analysis of qualitative sources, including unique and extensive interview material collected during several field trips to Kenya. Essay III finds that government bias makes it more difficult for the conflict parties to resolve their conflict through peace agreements. Essay IV finds that by engaging in governance roles otherwise associated with the state, non-state actors can become successful local peacemakers. Taken together, the essays make important contributions by developing, assessing and refining theories concerning the prospects for communal conflict resolution.

Under what circumstances can non-state actors become successful local peacemakers? A growing body of research documents the involvement of non-state actors in local conflict resolution in Africa. However, there is large variation in such actors' power, legitimacy, and ultimately their ability to contribute to conflict resolution. The ways in which contextual and dynamic factors at local and national levels, and in particular the relationship between non-state and state actors and institutions, affect local conflict resolution are not sufficiently understood. To address this gap, this paper analyses the peace process addressing a long-standing conflict in Kerio Valley, Kenya. The analysis illustrates how the failure of the state to provide security and basic services led non-state actors to fill important roles in governance. Through this process, they were endowed with legitimacy and power which enabled them to play key roles in a peace process that led to a mutually acceptable peace agreement.

What factors drive governments' decisions to intervene in local conflicts within their borders? Communal conflict – that is, organized violence between non-state groups that are mobilized along a shared communal identity – kills thousands each year and severely impacts local livelihoods, at times threatening to spread and affect entire regions. Given the state's assumed monopoly over the legitimate use of force, we should expect the concerned governments to be critical actors of the overall effort to restore peace in cases of local communal conflict, but empirical evidence indicates that central states tend to only intervene in some cases but not in others. This phenomenon has so far been understudied and the variations in states' efforts to manage these conflicts remain unexplained. This article presents the first quantitative study of state intervention in communal conflicts. Building on existing scholarly work, I argue that state intervention is explained by a combination of strategic interests and state capacity, and that interests related to ethnic constituencies and land control play an important part in explaining governments' strategies. These propositions find support in a statistical analysis covering sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2010.

What factors drive governments' decisions to intervene in local conflicts within their borders? Communal conflict – that is, organized violence between non-state groups that are mobilized along a shared communal identity – kills thousands each year and severely impacts local livelihoods, at times threatening to spread and affect entire regions. Given the state's assumed monopoly over the legitimate use of force, we should expect the concerned governments to be critical actors of the overall effort to restore peace in cases of local communal conflict, but empirical evidence indicates that central states tend to only intervene in some cases but not in others. This phenomenon has so far been understudied and the variations in states' efforts to manage these conflicts remain unexplained. This article presents the first quantitative study of state intervention in communal conflicts. Building on existing scholarly work, I argue that state intervention is explained by a combination of strategic interests and state capacity, and that interests related to ethnic constituencies and land control play an important part in explaining governments' strategies. These propositions find support in a statistical analysis covering sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2010.

How do local power-sharing arrangements affect levels of ethnopolitical hostility? The introduction of decentralisation in contexts previously marked by communal conflict underscores the need to assess local power-sharing mechanisms. However, existing literature on power-sharing has mainly examined national-level arrangements. In this article we contribute to the literature on decentralisation and ethnopolitical conflict by analysing two conflict-affected cases in Kenya. We find that local power sharing in Nakuru made intercommunal relations less hostile than in Uasin Gishu, where no such arrangement was present. The introduction and effects of local power sharing, however, is highly conditioned by national politics.